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CONSPIRACY, THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE,
WHITE COLLAR CRIME AND FEDERAL
PROSECUTION: A PRIMER FOR PRACTICE
DONALD

H.J. HERMANN*
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9. Conspiracy to Defraud by Violation of the Internal Revenue Code
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Conspiracy prosecutions of the business enterprise and those
individuals associated with it can take two forms. In the first type
of case, the business enterprise and its associates are prosecuted
for the inchoate crime of planning and agreeing to commit a substantive offense or for the completed agreement to commit a substantive offense. In a second type of case, the business enterprise
and its associates are prosecuted for a substantive offense which
* Professor of Law and Director of Academic Planning and Interdisciplinary Study, DePaul University, Fellow in Law and Economics, University of Chicago School of Law (1975-1976). A.B., 1965 Standford University; J.D., 1968 Columbia University; LL.M., 1974 Harvard University.

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol; 9

is defined by statute as an agreement to attain some specific objective.1 The former type of prosecution has been properly criticized
for its vagueness and its broad sweep 2 in providing the basis for
prosecution where it is asserted that the proper ends of the criminal
law would best be served by limiting prosecution to the offense
itself. The latter type of prosecution of business enterprises for
agreements which are themselves defined as illegal involve situations where, despite difficulties with the inference of intent and
concern with possible chilling effects on otherwise desirable associational activity, society has proscribed these agreements because of
their harm to the functioning of the social or economic order.3 This
is the case with agreements to fix prices, regardless of whether there
1. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693-94 (1975).

See generally

Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy,72 HARv. L. REV. 920 (1959).
2. See Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE
L.J. 405, 413-414 (1959), where the author observes:
That a crime marked by so little procedural and evidentiary rigor
would prove a favorite of prosecutors was to be expected. It was,
of course, unlikely that so gross a justification as expediency would
be offered for treating conspiracy as a crime punishable separately
from, and in addition to, the sanction which could be imposed for
accomplishment of the unlawful purpose. A more elaborate rationale was fashioned, principally in the cases which refused to hold
that conspiracy merged in the completed conduct which was its
object. Building on the assumption that a group is more to be
feared than individuals acting separately, courts concluded that a
plan by two or more persons to commit crimes brings with it an
increased likelihood that: the participants will reinforce each other's determination to carry out the criminal object; the object will
be successfully attained; the extent of the injury to society will
be large; those who commit it will escape detection; and the
group's planning will have a long-term educative effect on its
members, with schooling in crime the result. The potency of some
or all of these theories is attested by the fact that conduct is occasionally classed as criminal when planned by two which would
not be a crime even if accomplished by one. "Conspiracy to defraud the United States" is the outstanding example, for federal
law knows no substantive crime of "defrauding the United States."
See also Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1137 (1973).
3. See, e.g., NORTHERN PAc. RY. V. UNITED STATES, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1958) where the Supreme Court noted the purpose of the Antitrust Laws
and the significance of the proscription of conspiracy to restrain trade:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter
of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competitive as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest material progress,
while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But
even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally
laid down by the Act is competition. And to this end it prohibits
"Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of

trade or commerce among the several States.
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is an actual power to fix prices and regardless of whether the prices
fixed are reasonable.'
This article will review the substantive law of criminal conspiracy as it applies to the business enterprise. Both the general
use of conspiracy as a charge against the business enterprise 5 will
be considered, as well as specific statutory provisions which make
particular agreements illegal." For the most part, this discussion
will be limited to conspiracy prosecutions under federal law since
state agencies have not used conspiracy prosecutions to control
business behavior to any great degree and, to the extent they have,
states have adopted approaches analogous to those used by federal
authorities.7 The nature of white collar crime first will be consid4. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397
(1927):
This aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective,
is the elimination of one form of competition ....
Agreements
which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity
of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed ....
5. The major statutory basis for federal conspiracy prosecutions is
18 U.S.C. If§ two
371. or
more persons conspire either to commit an offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more
of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object
of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such
conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for
such misdemeanor.
There are twenty-six other conspiracy provisions in Title 18, but these are
directed at such specific conduct as conspiracy to bribe in sporting contests;
(§ 224) and conspiracy to kidnap (§ 1201).
6. Specifically considered will be 15 U.S.C. § 1, conspiracy to restrain
trade; 15 U.S.C. § 2, conspiracy, to monopolize; and the use of the general
conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, to prosecute conspiracies to violate the

Federal Securities Law and the Internal Revenue Code.
7. Most state statutes define conspiracy as an agreement to commit
a crime (See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 99-104 (1958). Because of difficulties
with proof and vicarious liability, substantial efforts were made in the
Model Penal Code to refine the definition of conspiracy, its elements and
to place limits on the use of conspiracy. (See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.03
et seq. [Proposed Official Draft, 1962] [hereinafter cited as M.P.C.]) While
few jurisdictions have adopted the M.P.C. provision in its entirety (But
see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 903), many jurisdictions have liberally borrowed from the M.P.C. [See ARx. STAT. ANN. § 41-707 et seq. 1975);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-2-201 et seq. (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 511 et seq. (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 506.040 et seq. (1974); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 151, 154 (1975); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 161.450
et seq. (1975). The main thrust in statutory reform by states following
the M.P.C. and those which have developed alternative approaches is to
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ered and the application of general conspiracy provisions to such
criminal activity shall be examined. 8 Following-the general discussion, a significant amount of attention will be given to the elements
of the specific crimes of conspiracy to restrain trade and to monopolize.9 Finally, consideration will be given to the use of the general
conspiracy law to deal with the specific charges of conspiracy to
violate the federal securities laws and the Internal Revenue Code.' 0
It is the purpose of the article to identify the nature and variations in the charge of conspiracy as it involves the business enterprise. The hope is that not only will knowledge be gained of the
elements of the various conspiracy charges, but that a comparison
of the various uses of conspiracy will assist in identifying the great
variety of problems which seem to be associated with differing conspiracy charges in order to aid law reform efforts in distinguishing
those uses of conspiracy theory which aid effective regulation of
business activity from those uses which make little contribution to
effective regulation and provide opportunity for substantial prosecutorial abuse.

1.

THE BusINEss ENTERPRISE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME-GENERALLY

The term "white collar crime" does not appear in any criminal
code of this country, nor does it have legal significance in the
criminal courts." Yet the concept has gained significance as
replace the vague specification of criminal agreement which makes it a

crime to agree "to commit any act injurious to the public health, to public
morals, or to prevent or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the
laws" (Cal. Penal Code § 182(5) [West 1970]), with a more limited specification of agreement to commit a crime (M.P.C. § 5.03(1) (a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The reform approach generally makes it a crime for
a person to agree to proceed in the prohibited manner, and avoids the problem presented by a requirement of an agreement between two or more persons which might be affected by the acquittal or nonprosecution of one
offender. Under the reform provisions, it is generally required that the
conspirator have acted with the purpose of promoting or facilitating commission of the object crime, this requires specific intent to engage in certain
conduct as opposed to simple knowledge which may serve as the basis for
a finding of guilt of the substantive offense. Most of the states revising
their conspiracy law have departed from the common law and now require
an overt act in pursuance of an agreement to commit a crime as a prerequisite for a conspiracy conviction. (See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.20
(McKinney, 1975)). For a general discussion of the status of the law of
conspiracy in state codes and the movement of statutory reform of conspiracy law, see generally Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the
Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM. LAW REV. 1122 (1975).
8. See text accompanying notes 6 to 48.
9. See text accompanying notes 49 to 182.
10. See text accompanying notes 183 to 214.
11. Introduction to a Symposium: White Collar Crime 11 THE Am.
CRiM. L. R. 817 (1973).
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efforts have been made to include within the penal law provisions
to control social and economic conduct such as monopolization,
12
securities fraud and consumer fraud.
"White collar crime" has been most usefully defined as "an
illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by non-physical means
and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid
the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business
or personal advantage."'13 A classification of white collar or
business crimes has been developed which suggests that, outside
of the context of organized crime, these crimes may be variations
of the standard property crimes or may involve violations of various
statutory schemes designed to control specific business behavior.
White collar crime can of course involve a single individual as in the
classic case of the bank teller who embezzles. White collar criminal
activity is as likely to involve, however, individuals in group collaboration who either jointly plan and execute the crime, or who
participate at separate stages of a plan.
A classification of white collar crime has been developed which
is helpful in determining whether a white collar crime should be
viewed (1) as a crime which only incidentally involves a group
effort, such as credit fraud, or (2) as a crime which by its nature
requires collaborative effort such as many forms of antitrust violations.'14 This classification is:

A. Crimes by persons operating on an individual basis or
by a group of individuals operating on an ad hoc basis
(e.g., credit fraud, individual income tax violations,
bankruptcy fraud and welfare and social security
fraud);
B. Crimes in the course of their occupations by those
operating inside business, government or other establishments, in violation of their duty of loyalty and
fidelity to employer or client (e.g., commercial bribery
and kickbacks, bank violations by officers or employees, union embezzlement, securities fraud by in12. Id.
13.

H. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COL-

LAR CRIME 3 (1970). This definition avoids the social judgment and overly
restrictive effect of the definition offered by Edwin Sutherland in his classic
work on white collar cime in which he stated "may be defined approximately as a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social
status in the course of his occupation." E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR
CRnIE 9 (1949).

14. This classification system is adopted from "Appendix A" of H.

EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME

73-75 (1970).

A more complete development of this classification can be

found in that work. This sytem does not include organized crime.
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siders, employee larceny, fraud against government by
padding payrolls or false claims or conflicts of interest);
C. Crimes incidental to and in furtherance of business
operations,but not constituting the central purpose of
the business (e.g., tax violations, antitrust violations,
commercial bribery, food and drug violations, false
weights violations of Truth-in-Lending Act, Securities
Act violations, physician and pharmaceutical violation
of drug laws, immigration fraud, housing code violations, deceptive advertising, false claims or statements
to government, labor violations, commercial espionage);
D. White collar crime as a business or as the central
activity (e.g., medical fraud, bankruptcy fraud, securities fraud, chain referral schemes, debt consolidation
schemes, merchandise swindles, land frauds, personal
improvement schemes, credit card fraud, insurance
fraud, false security frauds, F.H.A. frauds, AID frauds,
coupon redemption frauds, mail order swindles).
The first two categories of crime only incidentally involve
group collaboration, and one may question the propriety of using
conspiracy law to prosecute such crimes where prosecution for the
substantive offense or aiding and abetting may suffice. In the
latter two categories of crime, group or collaborative effort is often
necessary for successful completion of a course of criminal activity
and the availability of the conspiracy charge seems more appropriate for dealing with group agreements or collaborative efforts.
2.

CONSPIRACY AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME-GENERALLY

A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to
commit a criminal act or to use unalwful means to accomplish what
would otherwise be lawful.' 5 Conspiracy may be the sole basis
of a prosecution,' 6 or it may be joined in a separate count with
the prosecution of a substantive offense that is the object of the
conspiracy. 17 Moreover, conspiracy is punishable even though it
may entirely fail of its object.' 8
15.

Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 123 (1842).

Traux

v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327 (1921). See generally, Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922) and Developments in the Law, Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920 (1959).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 85 (1915); Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
17. See, e.g., Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913).
18. Sneed v. United States, 298 F. 911, 913 (5th Cir. 1924), cert. denied,
265 U.S. 590 (1924).
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The elements of a crime of conspiracy include agreement,' 9
intent, 20

knowledge

and

unlawful

object.2 1

An agreement

is

22

Absent a controlling statute,
essential to a crime of conspiracy.
an overt act is not a necessary element of the crime. 23 There
cannot, however, be a conspiracy without specific intent in the
minds of at least two parties to the conspiracy. 24 The fact that
a party commits illegal acts that further the object of a conspiracy
does not create liability as a conspirator absent knowledge of the
conspiracy. 25 However, knowledge of a conspiracy can be inferred from an expression of criminal intent or from an action whether
in itself criminal or not.2 6

There need not be knowledge of the

entire scope of the conspiracy, nor knowledge of all the parties to
the conspiracy; what is required is that the conspirator know of
an illegal agreement and choose to become part of it.

27

While

the object of a conspiracy need not be criminal itself if unlawful
means are being used to attain an otherwise legal object, the United
States Supreme Court has evidenced concern with vagueness
and overbreadth with statutes attempting to make criminal combinations injurious to public health or morals or to trade or
commerce.

28

The form that the most general business conspiracy takes is
19. See generally Cousens, Agreement as an Element of Conspiracy,
23 VA. L. REv. 898 (1937).
20. See generally Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L.
REv. 624 (1941).
21. See generally Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. R. 393
(1922). See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
470 (1972), where the authors observe:
Under the traditional definition of conspiracy, the objective
need not be criminal; it is sufficient if it is "unlawful", a term
which is broad enough to encompass a variety of non-criminal objectives harmful to individuals or the public .... Several persons
may be parties to a single conspiracy even if they have never directly communicated with one another; the question is whether
they are aware of each other's participation in a general way and
have a community of interest.
22. United States v. Zuideveld, 316 F.2d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 916 (1964). See also W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, supra note
21, at 460: "[T] he agreement itself is the requisite act."
See W. LAFAVE & A.
23. Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52, 55 (1921).
ScoTT, note 21, at 476-78.
24. United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941). See generally Cousens, Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy, 23 VA. L. REv.
898 (1937).
25. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940). See generally
Fridman, Mens Rea in Conspiracy,19 MODERN L. REv. 276 (1956).
26. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
27. Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 1937).
28. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
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that of a conspiracy to defraud. 9 An indictment charging a conspiracy to defraud does not need to allege in detail the fraudulent
0
While
means utilized to achieve the purpose of the conspiracy.
1
it
contemplated,
fraud
particular
the
specify
to
it is necessary
concharging
has been held for instance, that in an indictment
spiracy involving land fraud committed against the United States,
82
The
it was not necessary to specify any particular tract of land.
statute prohibiting conspiracies to defraud the United States encompasses not only conspiracies that might involve loss of government funds, but also any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing,
obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of
33
government.
3.

LIABILITY OF THE

BusINEss

ENTERPRISE AS A CONSPIRATOR

To constitute a conspiracy, there must be a combination of two
or more persons.8 4 Obviously, the individuals that form the
business enterprise may conspire among themselves, but for the enterprise to be liable as a conspirator, it must have a legal identity.
This limits conspiracy prosecutions of business enterprises to those
which the law recognizes as entities such as the corporation or
independent subsidiaries.3 5 Since there must be at least two
guilty parties, acquittal of all persons with whom the defendant
is alleged to have conspired prevents his conviction.88 While this
traditional view predominates, some courts have observed that it
rests on the faulty premise that a not guilty verdict is a declaraan indication of the absence of guilt
tion of innocence rather than
37
beyond a reasonable doubt.
29. See, e.g., defrauding secured creditors, 18 U.S.C. § 658 (1970); rig-

ging a sporting contest, 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1970); and bankruptcy fraud, 18
U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
30. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 191 (1909).
31. Hamner v. United States, 134 F.2d 592, 594-95 (5th Cir. 1943).
32. Dealy v. United States, 152 U.S. 539, 543 (1894).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). See also United States v. Johnson, 383
U.S. 169 (1966). Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68
YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
34. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 121 (1842).
35. See generally Barndt, Two Trees or One? The Problem of IntraEnterprise Conspiracy, 23 MONTANA L. REV. 158 (1962). See also Stengel,
Intra-EnterpriseConspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss.
L. J. 5 (1963).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1956).
See generally Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 920, 972-74 (1959).
37. United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 1942). See also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1962).
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If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done
by any of them in furtherance of the agreement is deemed the act
of each of them for which they are jointly responsible.38 Liability
follows not only from any act originally agreed to, but also to any
act in furtherance of the original purpose agreed to.3 9 A defendant
is not liable to punishment as a member of a conspiracy if he withdraws before the overt act has been committed. 40 To escape
liability it is necessary to give notice to all confederates by an
affirmative act that would be sufficient to inform a reasonable person of withdrawal. 41 One can join an existing conspiracy either
by actual agreement or by committing an overt act with knowledge
and in furtherance of an existing conspiracy.42 One who joins
a conspiracy after its formation is equally culpable with all original
43
conspirators.
44
Although a corporation may be indicted as a conspirator,
problems arise where the alleged conspiracy involves a corporation
and its officers, directors or employees. There has been a suggestion that there can be conspiracy among the directors of a corporation acting in their official capacity. 4 5 Moreover, when a corpora-

tion commits a crime, the officers and directors who participated
in the unlawful act are guilty of criminal conspiracy.40 While
some courts have held that a conspiracy cannot exist between a
corporation and one of its agents,47 it has generally been held that
a corporation can conspire with its agents and officers to accomplish
an unlawful purpose. 4 Moreover, separate corporate subsidiaries
or a parent corporation and a subsidiary can conspire. 49 However,
38. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 253-54 reh.
denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940).

39. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946).
40. United States v. Britton, 108 U.S. 199, 205 (1883).
41. Loser v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 30, 177 P.2d 320 (1947).
See

5.03, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
42. Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 1937).
43. Baker v. United States, 21 F.2d 903, 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
276 U.S. 621 (1927).
44. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); accord,
United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
MODEL PENAL CODE

denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, rehearingdenied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940).
45. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). See also
Meninshohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 1939).
46. Barron v. United States, 5 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1925).
47. Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737, 745 (8th Cir.
1909)
48. Schine Chain Theater Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116

(1948).
49.

Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th
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courts have held that separate divisions of a single corporation
50
cannot be held to conspire.
Since a conspiracy involves an agreement in furtherance of a
common objective, the relationship of buyer and seller, standing
alone, will not support a charge of conspiracy since the desires to
buy and to sell are diametrically opposed. 51 However, a buyer
who enters into a continuing relationship may become a conspirator,
since a buyer of stolen property who agrees to further purchases
may be agreeing to become part of a distribution scheme. 52 Moreover, a buyer who is understood to be a middleman will be liable
as a conspirator in a distribution scheme where the subject matter
of the transition is illegal, as in the case of stolen interstate automobiles or in the case of narcotics.53
4.

CONTRACT, COMBINATION OR CONSPIRACY TO RESTRAIN TRADE

Section 1 of the Sherman Act

54

provides in part:

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal ....
Section 1 does not attempt to define the types of conduct which
constitute a "contract," "combination" or "conspiracy" in "restraint
of trade." Courts have held that they must be given the same general meaning and construction as under the common law. 55 The
modifying term "every" has to be construed to mean unreasonable
contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. 56 Section 1 imposes criminal liability for violation of its provisions and
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).

See also Timken Roller Bear-

ing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
50. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 284 F.2d

599, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1960) rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
51. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
52. United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1040 (1972).
53. See United States v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542, 549 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
55. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 498 (1940).
56. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 5960 (1911). See also Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,
359-60 (1933), where the Court said:
As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions. It does not go into detailed definitions which might either
work injury to legitimate enterprise or through particularization
defeat its purposes by providing loopholes for escape. The restrictions the Act imposes are not mechanical or artificial.
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currently authorizes sanctions of (1) a fine, not exceeding $50,000;
(2) imprisonment, not exceeding one year; and (3) both fine and
imprisonment. 57 When this provision is invoked by the government, defendants may be held liable in either civil or criminal proceedings. 58 A private party may bring an action for either equitable relief or damages or both; if for damages, a recovery of up
to treble damages can be obtained. 59
(A)

"Plurality"under Section 1 of the Sherman Act

Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires concerted action of two
or more persons, and is thus distinguished from Section 260 of the
Sherman Act which applies to individuals who monopolize or
attempt to monopolize as well as to group action in the form of
a conspiracy to monopolize or attempt to monopolize. 61 While the
terms "contract," "combination" and "conspiracy" have been used
interchangeably, 62 there have been efforts to distinguish their use
which suggest that the standard of proof of a contract or a combination is less exacting than that required to show the existence
of a conspiracy.6 3 A contract involves a binding agreement; 64 a
combination involves an association of at least two persons seeking
a common end;6 5 and a conspiracy refers to a plurality of actors
who agree either to act unlawfully or seek an unlawful objective
in a manner which can give rise to imputed liability. 6
A single corporation cannot violate Section 1.67 Currently,
courts hold that a corporation and its employees acting within the
57. Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282, amending ch. 647, § 1,
26 Stat. 209 (1890)

(codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).

See generally, Cox,

The Criminal Antitrust Case-Indictment Through Trial, 1963 N.Y.S. BAR
Ass'N. ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 98.

58. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (last sentence).
59. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), superseding ch. 647,
§ 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (formerly section 7 of the Clayton Act). See generally E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TRADE DAMAGE ANTITRUST AcTioNs (1965).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).

61. See text at notes 119-41 infra.
62. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
142 (1968).
63. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960); and
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149, reh. denied, 390 U.S. 1018 (1968).
64. United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 141 F. Supp. 105, 115
(N.D. Ill. 1956).

65. Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737, 745 (8th Cir.
1909).
66. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
67. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 469
(1962).
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scope of their employment will not be viewed as two or more parties
for purposes of finding a consipracy in violation of Section 1.68
However, if the acts of a corporate employee are outside his scope
of duty and are performed for his own private interests, the
employee can be deemed to be acting on his own behalf and capable
of conspiring with the corporation that employs him.69 Moreover,
the fact that a corporation and its employees may be viewed as
a single entity does not exclude liability of officers, directors or
employees' since they are liable under Section 1, if they have authorized, ordered or knowingly. participated in violations of Section 1
in conjunction with persons or entities other than their own corporations. 70 Thus, both a corporation and its officers can be found
liable under a conspiracy count involving other corporations or
other natural persons.
The requirement of a plurality imposed by Section 1 can be
satisfied by showing a conspiracy within a multi-corporate enterprise. 71 In the parent-subsidiary situation 72 or where there are
affiliated corporations, 78 there may be a plurality required for a
Section 1 conspiracy. However, it has been held that a corporation
and its unincorporated divisions, without any other corporation's
does not constitute a plurality for purposes of Section
involvement,
74
1.

(B)

"Acting in Concert" under Section 1
of the Sherman Act

Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires, in addition to plurality,
action in concert which is established by showing consensus or
agreement either directly or by inference. 75 While direct evidence
68. See, e.g., 'Beacon Fruit & Produce Co. v. H. Harris & Co., 152 F.
Supp. 702, 704 (D. Mass. 1957).

69.

Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914

(5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
70. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962).
71. Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph H. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211,
215 reh. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951). See generally McQuade, Conspiracy,
Multicorporate Enterprises and Section 1 of the Serman Act, 41 VA. L.
REV. 183 (1955); and E. Willis & R. Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of
Using CorporateSubsidiaries,43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20 (1968).
72. Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
73. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
74. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd.,
416 F.2d 71, 83 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062, reh. denied, 340
U.S. 939 (1951).
75. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
540-41 (1954).
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of agreement clearly satisfies this requirement, 76 in the absence
of such agreement, concerted action can be inferred from conduct
in furtherance of a common objective or by a uniformity of conduct. 77 Inference of concerted action can be drawn from such facts
as a course of dealing, pricing and production control, or territorial
78
market divisions.
(C)

Intent Required under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act

In order to satisfy the requirement of plurality and concerted
action, it is necessary to show that the parties intended to conspire,
70
While the intent to
contract or combine, to restrain trade.
or- by influence, the
directly
either
restrain trade must be proven
restrain trade are
to
motives of parties charged with conspiracy
8
irrelevant. " There is, however, no need to prove specific intent
to restrain trade; the requirement of intent is satisfied by establishing general intent-the defendants intended their acts to have
the consequences that they did have.8 ' Such general intent can
be implied8 2 as long as there is a showing of knowledge that at
88
Such knowledge can
least one other party would act in concert.
parties should
also be implied from facts which indicate that the
8 4
have known that concerted action was contemplated.
(D)

Behavior Constituting Unreasonable
Restraint on Trade

Only unreasonable restraints of trade are within the reach of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The classic formulation of the "rule
of reason" was provided by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States8 5 where it was observed that every contract
or agreement has- a restraining effect on trade: "To bind, to
76.

United States v. Trenton Batteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1926).

77. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).

78. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealer's Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 78 (1914).

79. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
80. Id. at 146.
81. United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525-543 (1913); accord, United
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
82. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
539-40 (1954).

83. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948).
84. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 703 reh. denied, 387 U.S. 949 (1967).
85. 246U.S. 231 (1918).
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restrain, is of the very essence. The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition." s 6 In making the determination of
whether a restraint "suppresses" competition, or is unreasonable,
the nature of the industry and the market in which a party operates must be taken into consideration:
"[I] ts condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
'8 7
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.

(i)

Price-fixing

Price-fixing and any arrangement to control prices is per se
illegal; 88 this includes any agreement to set, maintain, stabilize
raise, depress, fix or peg the price of goods or services.8 9 The
rationale for applying the per se rule to price-fixing agreements
is that such agreements can have no purpose except the elimination
or reduction of price competition.9" In criminal cases, all the
prosecution need establish is the presence of a price-fixing agreement and an overt act in its furtherance. 91 In civil treble-damage
suits, the plaintiff must, in addition, prove that an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy was the proximate cause of his
damage. 9 2 The only possible defenses in a Section 1 case involving
price-fixing are either a showing that the restraint in question does
not constitute price-fixing9" or an attack on the existence of interstate commerce. However, the latter attack is limited by the judicial determination that the scope of commercial activity to which
86. Id. at 238.
87. Id.
88. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218, reh.

denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940). See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and
the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775
(1965) and 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Rahl, Price Competition and the Price

Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 137 (1962); and
Comment, The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing Sans Power, Purpose or

Effect, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 837 (1952).

89. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
90. United States v. Trenton Batteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1926).
91. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1962).
92. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S.
656, 660 (1961).
93. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
See also United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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the Sherman Act applies is as broad as the commerce clause.0 4
Moreover, the amount of interstate or foreign trade involved is
not material since Section 1 of the Sherman Act brands as illegal
the character of the restraint and not the amount of commerce
affected 5
(ii)

Division of Markets

Like price-fixing agreements, agreements among competitors to
divide markets or allocate customers are illegal per se.96 Market
divisions among competitors are regarded as having no purpose
other than elimination of competition.9 7 Even vertical market
divisions imposed by a manufacturer on wholesalers or retailers
have been held illegal per se if the manufacturer has sold his
product to the distributors.9 8 The use of a trademark licensing
arrangement will not suffice to justify a division of territories by
potential competitors.9 9 A finding of a restraint of trade may also
result from an agreement with a potential competitor not to sell
a particular product line to a specified customer. 10 0
(iii)

Concerted Refusals to Deal or Group Boycotts

While a unilateral refusal to deal, without more and absent a
showing of any purpose to create a monopoly, is not an unlawful
restraint on trade, 101 a group boycott or a concerted refusal to
deal is almost always a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 10 2 The anticompetitive evil of concerted refusals to deal lies
94. United States v. Southeastern Underwriter's Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533,
553 (1948). See generally Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED. B.J. 282 (1965).
95. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940);
See generally Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED. B.J. 282 (1962).
96. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 241
(1899). See generally Bork supra note 88.
97. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598
(1951).
98. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1967).
99. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 356-57 (1967).
100. Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D.
Tenn. 1940), aff'd per curiam, 123 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1941).

101.

United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).

See gen-

erally Fulda, Individual Refusals to Deal: When Does Single Firm Conduct
Become Vertical Restraint, 30 LAW & CONTEM. PROB. 590 (1965).

102. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
See generally Buxbaum, Boycotts and Restrictive Marketing Arrangements,
64 MIcH.'L. REV. 671 (1966); Barber, Refusals to Deal, 3 PRACTICAL LAWYER
21 (1957).
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in the fact that their only purpose is to coerce parties who are not
members of a combination or conspiracy to follow a prescribed
course of action. 10 3 An illegal concerted refusal to deal may be
directed against customers' 0 4 or toward competitors. 0 5 Concerted refusals to deal may take the form of exclusive membership
clauses in trade associations, 106 agreements between competitors
07
to boycott those who will not conform to prescribed practices,
or agreements between manufacturers and certain distributors
limiting sales to competing distributors to sales made at a discrimatorily high price. 08
(iv)

Tying Arrangements

Tying arrangements are frequently treated as per se violations
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 0 9 Tying arrangements are contracts in which a seller or lessor conditions the sale or lease of goods
or services on the purchase of another product. 110 Tying. arrangements are of concern because they may force buyers into giving up
the purchase of substitutes for the tied product and they may destroy free access of competing suppliers of the tied product to the
consuming market."'
(v)

Reciprocal Dealing

Assuming the requisite impact upon commerce, all agreements
for reciprocal dealing are illegal per se. Such agreements include
both specific reciprocity agreements and reciprocity resulting from
the coercion of one party." 2 Reciprocal dealing involves ar103. Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600,
610-11 (1914).
104. Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461-62 (1941).
105. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S.
656, 660 (1961).
106. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945).
107. Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461 (1941).
108. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959).
(1949). See generally Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and
Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88; Pearson, Tying Arrangements
and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 626 (1965); and Baldwin and McFarland, Tying Arrangements in Law and Economics, 8 ANTITRUST BUL.
743 (1963).
110. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S.
131, 133-35 (1936).
111. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
112. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948). See generally
Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REV. 873
(1964).
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rangements by which sellers using their buying power obtain purchase commitments from their suppliers. 113 Proof of a voluntary
practice of reciprocal dealing will not suffice to preclude a successful charge of violation of Section 1. Reciprocity is an anticompetitive practice because it reduces competition based on the merits of
114
the products involved.
5.

COMBINATION OR CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE

Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the. trade or commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.115
This section of the Sherman Act deals with actual monopolization,
attempts to monopolize, and combinations and conspiracies to
monopolize." 6 The commentary following this general discussion
is restricted to a consideration of the conspiracy offense.
The three crimes specified in Section 2 are not mutually exclusive and a defendant's action may be found to be in violation of
each of the offenses. 1 7 A defendant found guilty of any one
offense can be subjected to (1) a fine not to exceed $50,000; (2)
a prison term not exceeding one year; or (3) both the fine and
prison term." 8 Any private party injured as a result of any of
the three acts specified in Section 2 can bring a. private trebledamage action." 9
Unlike Section 1, those portions of Section 2 which deal with
113. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 57
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
114. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S.* 592, 594 (1965).

See

generally Flinn, Reciprocity and Related Topics under the Sherman Act,

37 ANTrRUST L.J. 156 (1968). Reciprocity is susceptible to attack under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1) as well as under Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45) and Section 7
of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18).
115.

15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).

116.

United States v. Shapiro, 103 F.2d 775, 776 (2d Cir. 1939).

See

generally Turner, Antitrust Monopoly and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV.

L REV. 281 (1956); see also Mason, Current Status of the Monopoly, 62
HARV. L. REv. 1265 (1949).
117. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
119. The Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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actual monopolization or attempted monopolization can be the basis
for liability based on unilateral

action.120

The Section

1121

requirement of plurality also applies to actions brought under Section 2122 against combinations and conspiracies to monopolize. It
is not necessary that actual monopolization be obtained or approached to find a Section 2 conspiracy; all that is needed is a showing of concerted action with a specific intent to achieve monopolization 123 of a substantial part of commerce plus some overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
(a)

"Plurality" Requirement under Section 2 of the Sherman Act

To support an action brought for combination or conspiracy to
monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act it is necessary to
establish the existence of collaborative activity involving two or
more persons. 1 24 A combination to monopolize has been defined
as a consensual union of two or more persons which has as its purpose the fixing of prices or the exclusion of competition from the
market. 125 Such a conspiracy is by definition a consensual union
to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means or an unlaw26
ful purpose by lawful means.'
For a combination or conspiracy to exist, there must be
concerted action;127 no combination or conspiracy can be predicated on individual action alone. 28 The establishment of concerted action presents special problems where the alleged conspirators are connected with the same business enterprise. 129
Under the present law, parent corporations and their subsidiaries
can conspire to monopolize in violation of the Sherman Act if they
120. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
121.
122.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).

123. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
124. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
See generally Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743
(1950).

125. American Fed'n of Tobacco Growers, Inc. v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869,
871-73 (4th Cir. 1950). See generally Handler, Contract, Combination or

Conspiracy, An Antitrust Handbook (1958).
126. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83
(6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
127. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1966).
128. Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37, 43 (W.D. La. 1957).
129. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 30-36 (1955).
See generally Barndt, Two Trees
or One? The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 MoNr. L. REV.
158 (1962).
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are held out as competitors, 130 or if they act in concert to coerce
or restrain third parties,' 8 ' but not if they merely act collectively
to decide how they should conduct their own affairs. 8 2 Neither
joint activities between a company and its unincorporated divisions, 83 nor joint action by officers and employees of a single
business enterprise operating within their scope of duty,3 4 constitute a conspiracy.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 13 it should be noted, does not
make a restraint of trade by a single corporation an offense, so it
may be argued that officers and employees of a single corporation
cannot conspire with the corporation to commit the offense. The
corporation itself can violate Section 2, however, by monopolizing
or attempting to monopolize. Moreover, it can be argued that officers and employees of a corporation can conspire with it to violate
Section 2.136
(b)

Inferring the Existence of a Conspiracy to Monopolize

A conspiracy to violate Section 2 can rarely be established by
direct evidence; it must, therefore, be indirectly established from
words, acts or a course of conduct. 187 However, once the existence
of a conspiracy is established, it takes little direct evidence to
connect a conspirator with the conspiracy and subject him to
130. Keller-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211, 215 reh. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951).

See generally Willis and Pitofsky,

Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV.
20 (1968).

131. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
142 (1968).
132. Beckman v. Walter Kiddie & Co., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 1321, 1326
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,

408 U.S. 922 (1972).
133. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors, Ltd.,
416 F.2d 71, 84 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062, reh. denied, 397
U.S. 1003 (1970).

134. Nelson Radio & Supply Co., Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 200 F.2d 911,
914 (5th Cir. 1952).
135.

15

U.S.C. § 1 (1970).

See generally McQuade, Conspiracy, Multi-

corporateEnterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REV. 183
(1955).

136. See, e.g., Minonshohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939)
and State v. Parker, 114 Conn. 354, 158 A. 797 (1932).
137. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939);
United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 54 F. Supp, 828, 830 (D. Del. 1944),
modified on other grounds, 56 F. Supp. 297 (D. Del. 1945). See generally

Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962).
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liability under Section 2.138 Once a party is established to have
joined a conspiracy to monopolize, it is liable for everything done
during the period of its existence regardless of the exact time of
139
its participation.
Ordinarily, a conspiracy must be inferred from surrounding
circumstances.140
Such inference can be drawn from actions
taken; 14 1 an early example of such a conspiracy established by inference is that of a retail lumber dealers association which engaged
in concerted, systematic and periodic circulation of reports giving
confidential information including the names of wholesale lumber
dealers reported as selling to local consumers. 1 42 An inference
of conspiracy can also be drawn from a course of dealings, 143 an
145
exchange of words, 44 a tacit understanding or agreement,
47
14
or the acts or words of co-conspirators.1
business behavior,
(c)

Requirement of an Overt Act for Violation of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act

Proof of at least one overt act in furtherance of a combination
or conspiracy is an essential element as the courts have construed
the requirement of a Section 2 offense. 14 The necessary overt
act may be found in such practices as price-fixing, 1 49 price discrimination, 15 0 territorial allocation, 1 1 boycotts,' 52 tying arrange138. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 743-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
139. United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 137 F.2d 459,
463 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 783 (1943).
140. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946);
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914).
141. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
142. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914).
143. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 40 (1960).
144. Bausch Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 72 F.2d
236, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 589 (1934).
145. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 193 (1963).
146. John Wright & Associates, Inc. v. Ullrich, 203 F. Supp. 744, 750
(D. Minn. 1962), aff'd 328 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1964).
147. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394
(1948).
148. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). See generally Skilton, The Requisite Act in a Criminal Attempt, 3 U. PITT. L. REV.
308 (1937); and Note, 27 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 227 (1958).
149. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
150. Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 788 (10th Cir.
1967).
151. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 572
(2d Cir. 1961).
152. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12-13, reh. denied,
326 U.S. 802 (1945).
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ments, 15 3 cross-licensing agreements,15 4 or exclusive buying arrangements. 55
Since a conspiracy is defined alternatively as a combination to
accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means or an unlawful end
by lawful means, it it not necessary that the overt act necessary
to satisfy the Section 2 requirement be an unlawful act although
in most cases the acts cited have involved predatory or coercive
practices.156 It should be noted that in establishing a Section 2
combination or conspiracy of attempt to monopolize, the showing
of a specific intent by agreement to monopolize establishes the
required showing of dangerous probability of success.' 57 Where
acts fall short of actual monopoly, an intent to acquire that
monopoly is necessary to produce a dangerous probability that it
will in fact occur, and when the intent and consequent dangerous
probability exist, a violation of the Act is established.' 58 There
is, therefore, no requirement that the overt acts proven be shown
59
to actually create a dangerous probability of monopolization.
(d)

Requirement of Specific Intent to Monopolize for Violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act

To establish the offense of conspiracy to monopolize, there must
be a specific, subjective intent to gain an illegal degree of monopoly
power. 6 0 Specific intent to monopolize may be established by
direct evidence such as by showing an express agreement' 6 ' or
153. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 60809 (1953).
154. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
155.

United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).

156. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
See also United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 137 F.2d 459,
463-64 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 783 (1943).
157. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
158. Compare United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d
563, 573 (2d Cir. 1961) with Lessig v. Tidewater Pit Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474
(9th Cir.), reh. denied, 327 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964), and other cases where the charge is attempt to monopolize requiring
a showing of dangerous probability of success. See generally Hibner, Attempts to Monopolize: A Concept in Search of Analysis, 34 ABA ANTITRUST
L.J. 165 (1967); and Smith, Attempts to Monopolize: Its Element and Their
Definition, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 227 (1950).
159. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 57273 (2d Cir. 1961).
160. American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F.
Supp. 60, 64 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (1963). See also Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).

161. United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 54 F. Supp. 828, 832-34
(D. Del. 1944), modified on other grounds, 56 F. Supp. 297 (D. Del. 1944),
modified on other grounds, 61 F. Supp. 656 (D. Del. 1945).
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by actual words expressing intent. 16 2 However, specific intent
can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 168 Specific intent
can be inferred from illegal, predatory or coercive business practices
such as price-fixing, boycotts and tie-ins,'( 4 a course of dealing, 65 or from a showing of dangerous probability of monopoly
power which provides a basis for concluding what might otherwise
be considered ordinary business conduct is itself engaged in for purposes of gaining monopoly power. 66 In sum, specific intent will
be inferred upon a showing of a combination or conspiracy to
engage in unlawful or coercive practices, or of unfair or unethical
business practices. Where the proof rests on unfair or unethical
business practices, however, it has been required that a showing
be made of sufficient market power to pose a threat of achieving
67
actual monopoly.'
(e)

Requirement of Substantial Amount of Commerce for Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act

Section 1 of the Sherman Act 6 ' outlaws unreasonable
restraints on interstate commerce, regardless of the amount of commerce affected. 6 9 Section 2 of the Act 170 makes it unlawful
to conspire to monopolize "any part" of interstate commerce without specifying how large a part must be affected.' 7 ' The words
"any part" have been construed to mean that a substantial amount
of commerce must be affected by the combination or conspiracy
to restrain trade. 17 2 There is authority for the proposition that
162. Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp.
476, 484 (E.D. Md. 1965), aff'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).

163. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944), reh. denied, 323

U.S. 818 (1945).

165. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 (1963).
166. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.) reh. denied,

327 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).

167.

Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286,

298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 225 F2d 289 (2d Cir. 1955).

See also Turner,

Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. REV. 281, 305 (1956).
168.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).

169. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59

(1940).

170.
171.

15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), reh. de-

nied, 327 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).

172. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947). See
generally Eiger, The Commerce Element in FederalAntitrust Litigation, 25
FED. B.J. 282 (1965).
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when the charge is a combination or conspiracy there is no need
to determine a relevant product or geographical market. 7 3 This
authority is based on the theory that where the charge is conspiracy
to monopolize, the essential element is not the power, but the
specific intent, to monopolize. 174 A review of case authority suggests that a showing of any amount of commerce which is not de
minimus will satisfy the requirement of showing an "appreciable"
or "substantial" amount of commerce under the combination or
conspiracy provision of Section
6.

2.175

RELATIONSHIP OF CONSPIRACIES

SUBJECT TO PROSECUTION

UNDER

SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

Commentators have properly suggested that the conspiracy
condemned under Section 2 differs from that covered by Section
1;71

while a Section 1 conspiracy involves restraint of trade, a

Section 2 conspiracy is a conspiracy of which monopolization is the
primary end, whether it specifically restrains trade or not.1 77 Yet
a single combination or conspiracy can involve action or a plan of
action which will result in liability under both sections. 7 8 The
Supreme Court has at times treated the two sections as both being
directed against restraints of trade, with Section 2 having a somewhat broader reach. Section 2 was read as a supplement to Section
1, "to make sure that by no possible guise could the public policy
1 79
embodied in the first section be frustrated or evaded."'
The two sections differ in the degree of proof required. Since
there must be a showing of actual or potential monopoly to constitute monopolization or a dangerous probability of monopolization
to qualify as an attempt to monopolize under Section 2, the degree
of proof of competitive effect under Section 2 is greater than under
Section 1.180 Section 1, however, always requires a showing of
173. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395
n.23 (1956). See also Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th
Cir.) reh. denied, 327 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).

174. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573
(2d Cir. 1961).
175. Id. at 572. ($523,000 was appreciable although representing only

1 per cent of the industry's total volume); United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (5,000 licensed taxicabs in four cities).
176. See, e.g., E. Kintner, An Antitrust Primer108-09 (2d ed. 1973).
177. Smith, Attempts to Monopolize: Its Elements and Their Definition, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 227 (1950).

178. See e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
reh. denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940).
179. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
180. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, reh. denied,
310 U.S. 658 (1940).
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concerted activity, while section 2 monopolization or attempts to
monopolize may involve unilateral action.' 8 ' Only that part of
Section 2 dealing with combinations or conspiracies requires concerted action.' 8 2
7.

CONSCIOUS

PARALLELISM-CONSPIRACY

INFERRED FROM UNIFORM

ACTION

The doctrine of "conscious parallelism" has been developed to
account for the type of circumstantial evidence which will establish
a conspiracy under the Sherman Act.'8 3 The doctrine was established in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States'8 4 where the Supreme Court held that acceptance by competitors, without previous
agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, which if carried
out will result in a restraint of trade is sufficient to establish an
unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act. Yet proof of agreement remains necessary; proof of parallel business behavior alone
does not conclusively establish agreement.' 5 Conscious parallelism
is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder
may infer agreement and thus help support a finding of conspiracy;
but alone it is not enough.'8 6 However, conspiracy may be inferred
from proof of substantially uniform business behavior unrebutted
by defendants in a position so to do.' 8 7 While evidence of
conscious parallism is not conclusive, 8 8 it is evidence which is to
be weighed heavily.8 9 The Attorney General's National Commit-

tee to Study the Antitrust Laws' 90 established criteria for determining whether any uniformity of action is sufficient to permit an
inference of conspiratorial action: the pervasiveness of the uni181.

Dart Drug Corp. v. Parke Davis & Co., 344 F.2d 173, 182-83 (D.C.

Cir. 1965).
182.

Shoenberg Farms Inc. v. Denver Milk Producers Inc., 231 F. Supp.

266, 269 (D. Colo. 1964).

183. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962);
Note, Conscious Parallelism-Factor Fancy?, 3 STAN. L. REV. 679 (1951).
184. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939).
185. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 540-41 (1954).
186. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors,

416 F.2d 71, 84-85 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970), reh.
denied, 397 U.S. 1003 (1970).
187. Co-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
188. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 540-41 (1954).
189. Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573, 577 (10th Cir. 1956).
190. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTIRUST LAWS (1955).
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formity, the areas of uniformity and whether it extends beyond
price to cover other terms and conditions of sale, the extent of uniformity, the period of time over which uniformity can be observed,
the time lag, if any, between a change by one competitor and that
of another, the homogenuity or differentiation of production, the
pattern of price changes and any business justification for the
uniformity of behavior. 191
8.

PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw

The federal securities laws encompass the Securities Act of
1933,192 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,193 the Public Utility
Holding Act of 1935,'94 the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,115 the
Investment Company Act of 1940,196 the Investment Advisers Act of
1940,197 and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.198
With the exception of the last Act, the Securities Exchange
Commission has primary responsibility for the administration and
enforcement of all federal securities laws; it can investigate,
institute civil and administrative enforcement actions or refer cases
to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. 199 The federal securities statutes generally do not contain specific provision
indicating that any acts or failures to act will constitute a criminal
offense. Rather, with the exceptions of the Investment Advisers
Act 20 0 and Securities Investor Protection Act,201 each statute
includes: 20 2 a general proscription making willful violation of
any substantive provision of the statute or of any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder a crime; a specific proscription making
certain willful false filings pursuant to the statute a crime; and
a section setting forth maximum penalties to be imposed upon conviction. While most prosecutions under the federal securities laws
have been brought under the 1933 or 1934 Acts, indictments often
191. Id. at 39.
192. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa (1970).
193. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1970).
194. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1970).
195. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa to 77bbbb (1970).
196. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970).
197. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1970).
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78111 (1970).
199. See generally Douglas, Forward to a Symposium on the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1959).
200. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1970).
201. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78111 (1970).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 79z-3
(1970); 15 U.S.C. § 77yyy (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-48 (1970).
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mail and wire fraud, 20 4

conspiracy. 20 5

and
Charges of conspiracy to violate the securities laws, of course, hinge on a showing of a violation of the underlying substantive law. Both the 1933 and 1934 Act require a "willful" violation of one of the substantive provisions of the respective
Acts or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder in order
to constitute a crime; the term "willful" means only that the act
was done deliberately so that a person can willfully violate an
208
S.E.C. rule even if he does not know of its existence.
(a)

Conspiracy Prosecutions for FederalSecurities Law Violations

Prosecutions for conspiracy to violate the federal securities laws
are brought under the general criminal conspiracy provision in the
federal code. 20 7 Conspiracy charges can be employed to join mul-

tiple defendants and otherwise unconnected offenses arising out of
an over-all scheme to defraud. 208 The conspiracy charge enables
the prosecution to use evidence that might otherwise be excluded
under the hearsay rule; declarations of co-conspirators made in
furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against all persons who
are proven by independent evidence to be members of the conspiracy. 209 Moreover, the prosecution may obtain the testimony
of witnesses who are named as unindicted co-conspirators. 2 10
(b)

The Problem of a Charge of Single Conspiracy Under the
Securities Law

Indictments in securities cases are often lengthy since they deal
with complex schemes extending over several years involving
numerous conspirators. 2 11 The majority of S.E.C. criminal prosecutions allege a single overall conspiracy. This gives rise to one of
the most troublesome points in the conspiracy prosecution area,
that is, the proper number of conspiracy counts and the precise
203. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
204. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1970).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
See generally Developments in Law,
Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. Rlv. 920 (1959).
206. United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1970).

207.

18 U.S.C. § 370 (1971).

See generally L. Loss, SEcuaTiEs REGULA-

TION 1991 (1961).

208. See, e.g., United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964).
209.

See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1970).

210. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962).

211.

Id.

1WHITE COLLAR CRIME

10761

scope of the conspiracy or conspiracies to be charged in the indictment. 212

The number of conspiracies and the precise nature or

scope of each, are questions of fact for the jury.21 3 The precise
nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by ref21 4
erence to the agreement which embraces and defines its objects.

If there is a single agreement between conspirators, only one conspiracy exists no matter how diverse the object and no matter
how many the collaborators; however, if conspirators enter into
more than one agreement, then each agreement can constitute
a separate conspiracy. In Kotteakos v. United States, 215 the
Supreme Court reversed a conviction on a single conspiracy count
on the basis of material variance with the indictment where
eight or more conspiracies were actually proven at the trial; the

Court held such material variance prejudicial. 21 6- Courts have held,

however, that a single conspiracy charge can cover a range of conduct such as efforts to fraudulently gain control of the issuer and
efforts to distribute worthless, unregistered securities where there
was a finding of a central plan to effect the issuance and sale of
worthless or grossly over-priced unregistered securities. 217 There
is authority for the proposition that in complex financial fraud
prosecutions, with respect to conspirators who participate in almost
every aspect of a scheme, it will not be material if a single
conspiracy is alleged and a multiple conspiracy is found by the
jury.

21 8

A related problem arises from the charging of a number of
conspirators, some of whom only participated in one aspect of an
overall securities scheme. The possible unfairness to minor participants in complex conspiracy cases, in associating them with an
entire scheme has led courts to hold minor conspirators only liable
overall conspiracy of which he has or should
for that portion of the
219
knowledge.
had
have
212. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
213. Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 976 (1970).

214. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942).

215. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
216. Id. at 772. See generally Note, Federal Treatment of Multiple Conspiracies,57 COLUM. L. REV. 387 (1957).
217. United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 929, 945 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962).
218. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 864 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 953 (1964).

219. United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 757-58 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
U.S. 947 (1966).

denied, 384
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9. CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD THE UNITED STATES BY FRAUDULENT CONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF THE INTERNAL REVENE CODE

Conspiracy to violate the Internal Revenue Code is prosecuted
under section 371 of the Criminal Code, which provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not
more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years
220
or both.
One of the most troublesome problems arising in conspiracy
prosecutions for tax fraud is the tolling of the statute of limitations
for criminal prosecution of the fraud which is three years as provided in the Criminal Code:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no
person shall be prosecuted, tried or otherwise punished for
any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found . . .
within five 221
years next after such offense shall have been
committed.
Problems arise because other actions brought under the Internal
Revenue Code have longer periods of limitations; tax liability for
omitted income may be brought within six years, 222 and assessments for amounts not taxed on account of fraud are subject to
228
no statute of limitations.
(a)

Completed or Continuing Conspiracy in Violation of the Internal Revenue Code

Grunewald v. United States224 dealt with the question of
whether a tax fraud case would be affected by continuing efforts
of concealment so that the statute of limitations would not be
tolled. The defendants had used improper influence to obtain "no
prosecution" rulings for certain taxpayers in 1948 and 1949, dates
outside the three year statute of limitations,2 25 but had engaged
220. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). See generally J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAxATION 945 (1973) and Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United
States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
221. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970).
222. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6501(e).
223. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6501(c) i).

224. 353 U.S. 391 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Grunewald]. See generally Comment, The Grunewald Case: Problems of Conspiracy and SelfIncrimination,56 COLUM. L. REV. 1216 (1956).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970). Congress changed the limitation period
from three years to five years in 1954.
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in acts of concealment up to 1954, the time of the indictment. The
government contended that the conspiracy was of a continuing
nature and that the subsequent act of concealment which took place
within three years of the date of the indictment rendered the charge
timely. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that
once the central purpose of the conspiracy had been attained, the
statute began to run, and that a subsequent conspiracy to conceal
could not be implied from circumstantial evidence. The Court, in
Grunewald, therefore, appears to have accepted the notion that a
subsequent agreement to conceal may be a basis for finding that
a conspiracy continues beyond the commission of the underlying
offense, but the burden exists of proving a subsidiary agreement.
This burden is not met by showing acts of concealment as a basis
of inferring conspiratorial agreements to conceal. What appears
to be required is "direct evidence of an express original agreement
among the conspirators to continue to act in concert in order to
cover up, for their own self-protection, traces of the crime after
its commission. '22 6 So that if the conspiracy in Grunewald was
not merely to obtain "no prosecution" rulings but "to block collection of the tax," then the conspiracy could continue indefinitely
since there is no statute of limitations on a government action to
collect taxes in the case of a false or fraudulent return. The
Supreme Court remanded in Grunewald to have a determination
227
of fact as to the purpose of the original conspiracy.
CONCLUSION
The economic effect of corporate crime in the form of fraud,
antitrust violation and income tax invasion appears to be much
greater than that of personally committed offenses. But more than
this, business crime strikes at the heart of the laissez faire economy.
As Chief Justice J. Cullen Ganey of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania said in his pre-sentence
statement in the electrical antitrust case:
The conduct of the corporate and individual defendants
alike . .. have flagrantly mocked the image of that economic system of free enterprise which we profess to the
country and destroyed the model which we offer today as a
free world alternative to state control and eventual dictatorship. Some extent of the vastness of the schemes of price
fixing, bid rigging and job allocations can be gleaned from
the fact that the annual corporate sales covered by these
226. Grunewald at 404.
227. Id. at 415. See also Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960).
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bills of228
indictment represent a billion and three-quarter
dollars.

Conspiracy law is a potent weapon in the hands of the prosecutor of business crimes. Federal conspiracy prosecutions can be
brought under special statutes or under a general provision of the
Criminal Code which provides for the prosecution of the agreement
to commit an offense in addition to prosecution for the commission
of an offense. The breadth of the law of conspiracy and the degree
to which this charge seems to provide a second basis for prosecuting
the underlying substantive offense gives rise to serious criticisms
of its use.
However, in the area of antitrust law, the law of conspiracy
has been developed into a substantive charge in which the elements
have been set out in statute and elaborated upon by courts to the
extent that specific agreements can be seen to be illegal. Antitrust
conspiracy law properly aims at behavior of business which is
dangerous in its anticompetitive effect, and agreements, which can
have no other purpose than to reduce competition. Moreover, in antitrust prosecution much of the behavior which follows the agreement may involve no substantive criminal law violation; it is the
agreement itself which is illegal. The difficulty and danger in antitrust law is one of fact, that is the extent to which one
can properly infer an agreement from behavior and surrounding
circumstances.
Prosecution for conspiracy to violate the securities law and the
Internal Revenue Code, again provide examples of the use of conspiracy law to augment the prosecution of an underlying substantive offense. The broad sweep of these laws, the ability to assign
vicarious liability, and efforts to extend the statute of limitations
are prosecutorial objectives achieved by the addition of a charge
of conspiracy. As with the general use of conspiracy law, one may
question the propriety of the use of this additional charge in face
of the availability of prosecution for the underlying substantive
offense and the aiding and abetting of its commission.

228.

The New York Times, February 7, 1961, p. 26, col. 3.

